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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Cryopreserved Embryos
H UNDREDS of thousands of cryopreserved embryos' lie frozen in fer-
.tility banks throughout the United States.2 They are the by-products
of infertility treatments that began in the early 1970s.3 Since 1978, infer-
tile couples have been undergoing In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), a proce-
• 1. For convenience, this Article uses the term embryo to mean both pre-em-
bryos and embryos. Typically the term embryo denotes a fertilized ovum at the
stage of implantation. See Joshua S. Rubenstein, Posthumous Corporeal Rights: Is
There Sex After Death?: Practical Applications, Interpretations & Critical Analysis, in
WHAT You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE NEW GENETIC LAWS 375, 390 (Suffolk U. L.
Sch. ed. 2001) (explaining reproductive technology terms). A pre-embryo is a
four-to-eight cell zygote that exists within fourteen days of creation. See id. Pre-
embryos are what are cryopreserved. See id. Embryos exist when the cells differen-
tiate, that is, a stage in the IVF procedure that comes after the point at which the
fertilized ovum is cryopreserved and then thawed. See id.
The courts are by no means uniform in their use of terminology for embryos
existing at different stages of development. The Supreme Court of Tennessee
used the term "embryo" to describe cryopreserved embryos. See Davis v. Davis, 842
S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tenn. 1992) (involving divorce dispute over which party should
control use of cryopreserved fertilized ova). The SupremeJudicial Court of Massa-
chusetts, however, elected to use the term "pre embryo." See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725
N.E.2d 1051, 1052, 1059 (Mass. 2000) (enforcing male's choice in post-divorce
dispute to prohibit use of cryopreserved fertilized ova by wife). The New Jersey
court also used the term "pre embryo." SeeJ.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 710 (N.J.
2001) (involving post-divorce dispute over disposition of cryopreserved fertilized
ova produced from IVF). The Court of Appeals of New York used the term "pre-
zygote." See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 175 (N.Y. 1998) (holding that control of
cryopreserved fertilized ova should be resolved by reference to agreement of
parties).
In this Article, we refer to embryos during the cryopreserved fertilized ova
stage and during the subsequent implantation in the body of the "adopting" fe-
male stage. Therefore, we use the term "embryo" consistently regardless of the
stage of development.
2. Melanie Blum, Embryos and the New Reproductive Technologies, at http://www.
surrogacy.com/legals/embryotech.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2003) ("[Hjundreds
of thousands of embryos remain in storage .... "). The American Society for
Reproductive Medicine is conducting a study to quantify how many frozen em-
bryos exist. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Some See New Route to Adoption in Clinics Full of
Frozen Embryos, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2001, at 1 (stating American Society for Repro-
ductive Medicine is conducting study in part to advise its members on how, or
whether, to become involved in stem cell research). According to one estimate,
nearly 400,000 embryos are in storage, of which about three percent have been
earmarked for medical research and two percent are intended for donation to
recipients other than the genetic parents. Debra Rosenberg, The War over Fetal
Rights, NEWSWEEK, June 9, 2003, at 44 (stating findings of new study focused on
how many embryos are in storage).
3. In the early 1970's, scientific research was being conducted on the poten-
tial use of IVF at Columbia University and Columbia-Presbyterian Hospital in New
York City. Dr. Landrum B. Shettles was attempting to use the gametes of a Florida
couple to produce an embryo when his superior at the hospital intentionally de-
stroyed them. The destruction resulted in a much-publicized lawsuit. See Stuart
Lavietes, Dr. L.B. Shettles, 93, Pioneer in Human Fertility, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2003, at
31 (telling story of Dr. Shettles).
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dure in which eggs from ovaries are extracted and fertilized with sperm in
a petri dish to create embryos. 4 In the hopes of producing a pregnancy,
embryos are then implanted in the woman's uterus. For two decades, cry-
opreservation technology has enabled couples to freeze extra embryos re-
sulting from their IVF treatments. 5 Couples typically fertilize about a
dozen eggs in vitro and freeze the extra embryos that are not immediately
implanted. Freezing the extra embryos allows couples to avoid having to
repeat egg extraction and fertilization each time they attempt pregnancy. 6
When the number of cryopreserved embryos exceeds the needs of the
couple, legal issues sometimes arise regarding who may make decisions
about disposing of the surplus embryos. 7 The problem may be brought to
a court in a dispute between a man and a woman," or between a clinic and
a couple. 9 A dispute can arise about the disposition of gametes or em-
4. Hormonal injections are used to produce multiple oocytes (ova or eggs)
within the woman's body. The oocytes are then removed from the woman's body
and fertilized in a petri dish. This procedure results in embryos that can be trans-
ferred into the uterus. The first recorded child of this procedure was Louise
Brown, bom in England in 1978. Emily McAllister, Defining the Parent-Child Rela-
tionship in an Age of Reproductive Technology: Implications for Inheritance, 29 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 60-61 (1994) (explaining IVF); see also ANDREA L. BONNICKSEN, IN
VITRO FERTILIZATION 147-51 (1989) (containing in depth explanation of IVF).
5. See McAllister, supra note 4, at 62 (providing reasons for cryopreservation).
Cryopreservation is necessary when ovarian stimulation results in retrieving multi-
ple eggs that are fertilized with sperm, creating several embryos. See id. Cry-
opreservation eliminates the need to transfer all fertilized embryos, thus avoiding
an increased chance of multiple pregnancies. See id. Cryopreservation involves
cooling and dehydrating the embryo, treating it with cryoprotectant and storing it
in this frozen state. See id. When needed, the embryo is thawed and rinsed of the
chemical protectant before transfer. See id. at 63. Although cryopreservation may
decrease an embryo's viability, live births have occurred from embryos that have
been cryopreserved for a decade. See id. Cryopreservation even permits a child's
birth after the death of its genetic parents by implantation of the embryo in an-
other woman's uterus. See id.
6. Jennifer Kornreich, Souls on Ice, REDBOOK, Jan. 1, 2000, at 104 (explaining
that harvesting many eggs at once prevents multiple procedures). Because IVF
procedures typically cost between $7,000 and $20,000, and because few insurance
companies cover it, doctors stimulate the ovaries with drugs and harvest as many
eggs as possible at one time. See id. The result of this practice is that couples often
end up with many extra embryos. See id.
7. The first attempt to deal legally with the options for disposing of unused
embryos was in a report of the State of Victoria, Australia, when an American
couple died in an airplane accident after depositing fertilized ova in a clinic. See
State of Victoria, Report on the Disposition of Embryos Produced by In Vitro Fertilization
(1984), summarized in WALTER WADLINGTON & RAYMOND C. O'BRIEN, DOMESTIC RE-
LATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 741 (5th ed. 2002) [hereinafter State of Victoria].
8. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 585, 589 (Tenn. 1992) (involving disputes
between divorcing spouses over disposition of cryopreserved embryos); A.Z. v.B.Z.,
725 N.E.2d, 1051, 1052 (Mass. 2000) (same); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 175
(N.Y. 1998) (same).
9. SeeYork v.Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 424 (E.D. Va. 1989) (addressing case in
which 1VF clinic resisted efforts of man and woman to remove their cryopreserved
embryos to clinic in another state).
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bryos even after the death of a person, 10 or the death of the genetic
parents. I
In order to avoid such disputes, clinics typically require couples un-
dergoing IVF to sign an agreement memorializing what the couples want
done with their surplus cryopreserved embryos.' 2 Options include indefi-
nite storage, donating them to research or destroying the embryos. 1" To
some couples, however, none of these options is acceptable, and in some
jurisdictions these options may even be illegal. 14 Enter what is now re-
ferred to as "embryo adoption," the latest alternative in the reproductive
technology world.
B. Wat Is Embryo Adoption?
In addition to either donating embryos to research or destroying
them, couples now have the option of donating their surplus embryos to
other infertile couples. This new option is commonly referred to as em-
bryo adoption. The donated embryos are implanted in the female of the
donee couple. The genetically unrelated donee couple raises any result-
ing child. 15 In essence, embryo adoption provides a means by which a
woman can give birth to an "adopted" child. Unlike traditional adoption,
however, embryo adoption permits an otherwise infertile couple to experi-
10. See Hecht v. Kane, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 279 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(explaining that former wife and children of deceased man opposed release of his
cryopreserved sperm to his mistress, to whom he had willed his gametes); see also
Woodward v. Comm'r of Social Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 259-60, 272 (Mass. 2002)
(addressing Social Security Administration's argument that children born more
than two years after death of their father who had banked his sperm for his wife's
future use were not his children). The Massachusetts court ruled that the chil-
dren were the man's legal heirs under state law. See id. (providing holding of
case).
11. See State of Victoria, supra note 7, at 741 (noting dilemma as to disposition
of cryopreserved embryos after death of genetic parents).
12. See Ami S. Jaeger, Who Is the Parent?, 25 FAM. Anvoc., Fall 2002, at 7, 9
(discussing appropriate requirements for embryo consent agreements).
13. See id.; see also Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175 (enforcing agreement to donate
cryopreserved embryos for research).
14. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:123-9:133 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003)
(stating that in vitro fertilized ovum is juridical person and biological human being
under Louisiana law). Therefore, destruction of an embryo may be illegal under
Louisiana law. In Massachusetts, a statute prohibits the use of embryos for experi-
mental purposes. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12J (West 1996) (prohibit-
ing experimentation on live fetus either before or after it is implanted in uterus).
15. See Susan Lewis Cooper & Ellen Sarasohn Glazer, Embryo Adoption, in
CHOOSING ASSISTED REPRODUCTION: SocIAL EMOTIONAL & ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
ch. 9 (1998), available at http://www.perspectivepress.com/item.asp?recordid=car
embryo agestyle=default discussing embryo adoption); see also Embryo Adoption-
The Future Is Now (Oct. 8, 2002), at http://www.adoption.about.com/library/week
ly/aa071299.htm [hereinafter Embryo Adoption] (same); Bush To Promote "Embryo
Adoption" (MSNBC television broadcast, Aug. 20, 2002) (on file with author)
(same).
[Vol. 49: p. 169
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ence pregnancy, control prenatal care and get to know the child's genetic
parents. 16
C. A Report of an Embryo "Adoption"
Bob and Suzanne Gray had twenty-three embryos left over from their
fertility treatments. 17 The Grays are Christians who believe that life begins
at conception. 18 They believe that they have the moral obligation to find
their cryopreserved embryos suitable families in order to give them the
best future possible.19 In order to give each embryo a chance to be born,
the Grays intend to donate each embryo to infertile couples for
implantation.
The Christian Snowflake Embryo Adoption Program (the "Snowflake
Agency") matched and coordinated an embryo transfer between the Grays
and the Vests. Cara Vest gave birth to the Grays' genetic baby boy in May
of 2002, and, since that time, the two families have been in frequent
contact.
20
Embryo adoption is becoming an attractive option for couples like
the Grays, who are uncomfortable with destroying their embryos or donat-
ing them for research. 2 1 An added feature for donation is that on the
receiving end, gestating donated embryos is less expensive, and less com-
plicated, than going through a traditional cycle of IVF or paying an egg
donor for her donation.2 2
16. 16 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Adoption of Leftover Embryos Emerging as
an Option for Some Couples, MILWAUKEEJ. SENTINEL, Mar. 19, 2001, at 01G (citing
Susan L. Crockin, Boston lawyer who specializes in reproductive issues).
17. See A Tale of Two Families: Embryo Adoption Brings Them Together (Aug. 26,
2002), at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/primetime/DailyNews/embryo-adop
tion_020822.html [hereinafter A Tale of Two Families] (stating that after lVF, Mr.
and Mrs. Gray were left with problem of what to do with twenty-three fertilized
embryos left over from their fertility treatment).
18. See id. (stating Grays' dilemma).
19. See id. (discussing moral obligation to find family for embryos). The Grays
also had moral objections to abortion, and the husband stated that destroying an
embryo or using it for experimentation would not be different from abortion. See
id. (stating arguments in case). "'Snowflake babies' are some of the multiple un-
used embryos resulting from in-vitro fertilization and other alternative reproduc-
tive technologies." John Crouch, Adoption in the 21st Century, 25 FAM. ADvoc., Fall
2002, at 32. The word "Snowflake" reflects each embryo's individuality. See id.
20. A Tale of Two Families, supra note 17 (stating that families had reunion at
beach three months after child was born).
21. News reports indicate that the Bush administration developed plans to
distribute nearly one million dollars to promote embryo donation, noting that
there are "tens of thousands of embryos" in fertility clinics. See Bush To Promote
"Embryo Adoption", supra note 15 (quoting Bush as stating "if any of those embryos
could produce life, I think they ought to produce life.").
22. See Milandria King, Cold Shoulder Treatment: The Disposition of Frozen Embryos
Post-Divorce, 25 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 99, 131 (1999). Costs per IVF cycle alone
average around $10,500. See id. Egg donors are sometimes paid $15,000. See Stol-
berg, supra note 16, at 01G (declaring embryo adoption inexpensive alternative to
IVF); see also Mary Lyndon Shanley, Collaboration and Commodification in Assisted Pro-
2004]
5
Kindregan and McBrien: Embryo Donation: Unresolved Legal Issues in the Transfer of Surpl
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
The idea of donating a couple's cryopreserved embryos to another
couple seems simple. The process, however, raises several legal hurdles
that should be addressed before this new reproductive option becomes
commonplace. This Article explores how the law could treat embryo dona-
tion for purposes of "adoption" and considers potential problems the
practice raises.
2 3
II. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Theories
The term "embryo adoption" is misleading because it suggests that
adoption laws govern the procedure for donating one's embryos to an in-
fertile couple for implantation and gestation. Also misleading is the fre-
quent practice of donee couples' voluntarily submitting to criminal
background checks and home studies to determine their parental fitness,
as they would do if they were adopting children. 24 Furthermore, the me-
dia also falsely portrays embryo adoption as "legal adoption," when no le-
gal guarantees can or should be made.25 Even some IVF physicians seem
to believe that, apart from the fact that embryo adoption occurs far earlier
than baby adoption, the processes are similar.26
The word "adoption" creates a false sense of security for couples who
believe that they are voluntarily and legally terminating their parental
rights when they donate their embryos to another couple. No court has to
date resolved a contested embryo adoption dispute. The parties involved,
therefore, should not simply assume that an embryo can be legally
adopted, thus terminating the donor's legal rights and interests. The legal
risk of unintentionally maintaining parental interests and rights may com-
plicate the process of donating embryos.
It is apparent that terminology plays a role in the debate over embryo
adoption. Some supporters of "embryo adoption" might opt for a change
in the name to "embryo donation" or "embryo transfer" if it becomes clear
that the adoption concept is not achieving public support. In order to
creation: Reflections on an Open Market and Anonymous Donation in Human Sperm and
Eggs, 36 LAw & Soc'Y REv,. 257, 257-58 (2002) (citing two advertisements for egg
donor, one promising compensation of $25,000 plus expenses and another offer-
ing $50,000 compensation).
23. Emphasis is on the word "could" because there are few reported cases and
little statutory law directly dealing with most of the issues raised in this Article.
24. SeeAaron Zitner, Adopting Embiyos at Issue, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2002, at Al
("Transfers that help infertile couples have kids likely are the next flash point in
the abortion debate. Rights advocates are in a tough position."). Lucinda Boren,
an embryo recipient, states: "I really believe that I adopted children-babies-not
some dot on the page.... Ijust adopted them at a very young stage." Id. (quoting
embryo recipient Lucinda Boren).
25. See Embryo Adoption, supra note 15 (referring to embryo adoption as legal
adoption).
26. See Blum, supra note 2 (noting doctors believe there is little difference
between pre- and post-birth adoption).
[Vol. 49: p. 169
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soften criticism of the adoption analogy, the term "embryo donation"
could be used to suggest a non-commercial transfer of ownership for
which no express statutory authority is needed. "Donation," however, is a
property concept, and some may resist the substitution of property law
categories for traditional parentage concepts as a means of legally protect-
ing the parties to the transaction. "Embryo transfer" is a broader term,
which could encompass both traditional family law concepts and property
transactions. Perhaps "embryo donation for transfer" is the clearest termi-
nology. 27 Viewed as a mere cosmetic change, the use of these terms will
not affect the reality of what is happening, but could impact public accept-
ance or rejection of the procedure.
Regardless of what terminology is used to explain the procedure,
adoption law does not and cannot really apply to donating embryos be-
cause many state statutes specifically invalidate biological parents' consent
to adoption that is given prior to childbirth. A Massachusetts statute, for
example, states that parental consent to adoption must be in writing and is
not valid until four days after the child's birth. 28 Similarly, under the Uni-
form Adoption Act, valid surrender and consent to adoption can be given
only after the child's birth. 29 It logically follows that because embryos are
not children, adoption statutes cannot apply to their donation.
Even in the absence of such a statute, courts refuse to honor pre-birth
agreements to surrender a child for adoption. 30 For example, the famous
New Jersey In re Baby M3' decision, which recognized the parental rights
of a gestational surrogate mother was based in substantial part on the
court's belief that the pre-conception and pre-birth agreement to surren-
der a child constituted a "contractual system of termination and adoption
designed to circumvent our statutes."3 2
27. See Phyllis Griffin Epps, The Entwined Destinies of Roe v. Wade and Assisted
Reproductive Technology, at http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlawperspectivesv/Repro
ductive/000906Entwined.html (Sept. 6, 2000) (referring to embryo adoption as
"donation for transfer into another woman").
28. 28 See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 210, § 2 (West 1998 & Supp. 2003) (stat-
ing written parental consent to adoption must be made in writing and executed no
sooner than fourth day after birth of child). Exceptions to a statute governing
consent to adoption are strictly construed in order to protect the rights of the
biological parent. Cf In re Adoption of McNutt, 732 N.E.2d 470, 473 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1999) (stating Ohio law that parental consent is prerequisite to adoption).
29. UNIF. ADOPTION Acr § 2-204, 9 U.L.A. 43 (1994) (stating timing for con-
sent to adoption).
30. See 2 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES § 21.5 (2d ed. 1987) (noting many state statutes validate only con-
sent given during specified period after child's birth and, even in absence of such
statute, courts have ruled prenatal consent to adoption invalid).
31. 537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (NJ. 1988) (ruling pre-conception agreement by sur-
rogate mother to surrender child for adoption after birth of child invalid and
unenforceable).
32. Id. at 1246 (stating pre-conception and pre-birth agreement creates sys-
tem of termination and adoption that ignores New Jersey law).
2004]
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Apparently physicians have been transferring embryos between con-
senting parties for a number of years without concern for legal considera-
tions, or even a contract between the parties. 33 As the practice of embryo
adoption is currently evolving, however, the use of contractual arrange-
ments is becoming characteristic of the practice. These contracts address
embryo disposition in terms of parental rights and visitation issues in the
contingencies of death, separation or divorce of the parties. Such provi-
sions are adopted from egg-donation and surrogacy contracts, contracts
that a number of commentators now advocate.
3 4
The use of a pre-birth contract to determine parental rights and inter-
ests in an embryo donation scenario, however, presents its own problems.
Pre-birth contractual attempts that only express the donors' consent to
surrendering custody of the embryo, and that remain silent on adoption,
may not be valid and enforceable. As the court decided in the Baby M
case, a pre-birth contract that does not address adoption may be held un-
enforceable if the court construes it as an attempt to evade the purpose of
the adoption statute.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed this issue in
IR. v. M.H.3 5 In that case, a surrogate mother decided to renounce the
pre-birth contract to give up custody of any resulting child conceived and,
in the sixth month of pregnancy, announced that she intended to keep
the baby.36 The Massachusetts court held that "[allthough a consent to
surrender custody has less permanency than a consent to adoption, the
legislative judgment that a mother should have time after a child's birth
... [to decide whether to consent to adoption] weighs heavily in our con-
sideration whether to ... [enforce] a prenatal custody agreement." 37 Sim-
ilar to surrogacy, the enforceability of contractual agreements in embryo
donation cases remains uncertain. Can either of the genetic parents re-
voke the contract after the birth of the child and seek custody?
Although attractive, the use of an adoption or contract model is likely
to encounter legal pitfalls in the absence of a statute that specifically au-
33. See Zitner, supra note 24, at Al ("Doctors have been quietly transferring
embryos between willing couples for years . . ").
34. See Noel A. Fleming, Navigating the Slippery Slope of Frozen Embryo Disputes:
The Case for a Contractual Approach, 75 TEMP. L. REv. 345, 371 (2002) (discussing
need for contractual framework for unused frozen embryos); John A. Robertson,
Prior Agreements for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 51 OHIo ST. L.J. 407, 414 (1990);
Paula Walter, His, Hers or Theirs-Custody, Control and Contracts: Allocating Decisional
Authority over Frozen Embryos, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 937, 948 (1999) (discussing
need for clear guiding principles to protect all parties); Jessica Weiner & Lori An-
drews, The Donor Egg: Emerging Issues in Liability and Paternity, 25 FAM. ADVOC., Fall
2002, at 14, 17 (stating premise that comprehensive contracts should be drafted to
mitigate future litigation).
35. 689 N.E.2d 790, 791-93 (Mass. 1998) (discussing how surrogate contracted
to give husband custody of child if one was born, inseminated herself with sperm
of husband and then renounced agreement during her pregnancy).
36. See id. (stating facts of case).
37. Id. at 796 (stating court's reasoning).
[Vol. 49: p. 169
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thorizes embryo donation and that identifies the respective rights and lia-
bilities of the parties. Adopting children was not permitted under the
early common law of either England383 or America,39 meaning that adop-
tion is purely a creature of statute. 4° Given the intensity of the recent
debate over stem-cell research, abortion, sales of ova, cloning and other
similar controversies, it is not likely that a legislative consensus on embryo
adoption is going to develop in the near future.
If a state were to enact a statute for embryo adoption, it might con-
sider reviewing the Louisiana statute. Louisiana authorizes "adoptive im-
plantation of fertilized human ovum" when genetic progenitors renounce
their parental rights over their cryopreserved embryos in favor of another
married couple. 41 The statute requires the donee couple to consent to
the adoption of the embryo by executing a notarial act of adoption.42
Louisiana is not a common law state, and much of its code is premised on
French law. Indeed, this statute appears to be premised in part on French
law, which accords dignity to the human embryo. The Louisiana statute,
however, does not follow the French model of exempting embryos con-
ceived in vitro from legal protection.
Where French law provides for destruction of excess embryos that are
not used for IVF implantation, 43 Louisiana law treats the embryo as ajudi-
cial person, a biological human being,4 4 and allows the embryo to be
adopted. 45 The Louisiana statute does not authorize destruction of the
excess embryos; rather, the statute favors the use of extra embryos for
pregnancies. Also, the Louisiana statute does not address the multiple le-
gal issues associated with embryo adoption, presumably leaving those is-
sues for the courts to resolve on a case-by-case basis. Such issues include
tort liability, resolution of support and custody disputes, embryo theft and
fraud.
38. See Adoption Child Act, 1926, 16 Geo. 5, c. 29 (Eng.) (authorizing adop-
tion in England after history of forbidding adoption).
39. The American states enacted adoption laws throughout the 19th Century.
See, e.g., Mass. St. 1851, ch. 324 (current version at MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 210 § 1
(1998)).
40. SeeAdoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 317-18 (Mass. 1993) ("The law of
adoption is purely statutory .... ) (citing Davis v. McGraw, 92 N.E. 332 (Mass.
1910)).
41. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:130 (West 2002) (expressly authorizing donation
of fertilized human ovum by couple not being compensated for embryo).
42. See id. ("Constructive fulfillment of the statutory provisions of this state
shall occur when a married couple executes a notarial act of adoption of the in
vitro fertilized ovum and birth occurs.").
43. SeeJonathan F.X. O'Brien, Cinderella's Dilemma: Does the In Vitro Statute Fit?
Cloning and Science in French & American Law, 6 TUL. J. INT'L. & COMP. L.. 525, 527-
35 (1998) (summarizing French law governing embryos).
44. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-9:135 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003) (provid-
ing statutes governing embryos).
45. See id. § 9:130 (authorizing adoptive implantation of fertilized human
ovum).
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B. Applying Gestational Surrogacy Law
Given the difficulties that exist in applying adoption law to embryo
adoption, another legal analogy might be considered. 4 6 Rather than at-
tempting to analogize traditional adoption law to the practice, the law gov-
erning gestational surrogacy arrangements may be more suitable. In a
gestational surrogacy arrangement, a woman gestates an embryo that is
created from the gametes of another couple. 47 Similar to embryo adop-
tion, in gestational surrogacy the birth mother is unrelated to any result-
ing child. 48 The only difference is that in gestational surrogacy the birth
mother intends to relinquish any resulting child upon its birth, whereas in
embryo adoption the birth mother intends to keep and raise any resulting
child. Applying the law that governs gestational surrogacy arrangements
to embryo adoption scenarios would circumvent the problem with apply-
ing adoption law by minimizing the difficulties associated with pre-concep-
tion and pre-birth consent to "adoption" of embryos.
The theory of treating gestational surrogacy and embryo adoption as
legally analogous is consistent with the holdings in noteworthy decisions of
the courts in California and Massachusetts. In Johnson v. Calvert49 and Cul-
liton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center,50 the courts determined that
adoption law is inapplicable to gestational surrogacy arrangements. 5 1 In
Johnson, the California court ruled that "[g]estational surrogacy differs in
crucial respects from adoption."52 The Massachusetts court in Culliton
ruled that adoption law applies only when the birth mother has a genetic
46. For a discussion of the inapplicability of adoption law to the donation of
embryos, see supra notes 24-45 and accompanying text.
47. A Massachusetts court has described the process as one in which "the
birth mother has had transferred to her uterus an embryo formed through in vitro
fertilization of the intended parents' sperm and egg." R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d
790, 795 n.10 (Mass. 1998) (noting different considerations concerning IVF and
surrogacy).
48. In a gestational surrogacy arrangement, the birth mother and child are
not genetically related except in the situation where one of the genetic parents is a
blood relative of the birth mother. See id.
49. 851 P.2d 776, 784 (Cal. 1993) (finding legal parents to be genetic parents,
not birth mother who was not genetically related to child, and rejecting birth
mother's argument that adoption statute prohibited arrangement).
50. 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1136 (Mass. 2001) (ruling that genetic parents are legal
parents of child being carried by pregnant surrogate who had no genetic connec-
tion to child in her womb and that adoption laws do not bar arrangement). Cut-
liton was an uncontested case where the court employed its equity jurisdiction. See
id.
51. SeeJohnson, 851 P.2d at 784 (ruling that gestational surrogacy is different
from adoption and therefore adoption statute does not apply); see also Culliton, 756
N.E.2d at 1137-38 (distinguishing gestational surrogacy arrangements in which
birth mother is unrelated to child from traditional surrogacy arrangements in
which birth mother is also genetic mother of child).
52. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 784 (stating that gestational surrogacy is not subject to
adoption laws because it differs significantly from adoption).
[Vol. 49: p. 169
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol49/iss1/4
EMBRYO DONATION
relationship to the child.5 3 These cases suggest that in the reproductive
technology arena, adoption law only applies to traditional surrogates who
have a genetic relationship to the child. It does not apply in cases of gesta-
tional surrogacy, where the birth mother is genetically unrelated to the
child. Because a woman gestating an "adopted" embryo also bears no ge-
netic relationship to the resulting child, the situation should be treated
like gestational surrogacy arrangements instead of like traditional adop-
tion arrangements. 5 4 In other words, if embryo "adoption" and gesta-
tional surrogacy are basically the same reality, they ought to be treated
similarly and independently from traditional adoption law concepts. If
embryo adoptions are treated the same as gestational surrogacies, then
embryo adoption arrangements should also be governed by the terms of
the contract that the parties execute.
Contracts memorializing the intent of the parties in connection with
embryo "adoption" should spell out the parental rights of the donor and
donee couples. In Culliton, the Massachusetts court upheld the parental
rights portion of a contract by holding that when all parties agree, the
genetic parents in a gestational carrier arrangement could be placed on
the child's birth certificate as the legal parents. 55 This decision could ap-
ply to embryo adoption arrangements by allowing courts to enter a declar-
atory judgment rendering the intended parents (the donee couple) the
legal parents of any resulting child, as long as all parties agree. As dis-
cussed in Culliton, delays in declaring the intended parents the legal par-
ents increase the risk of interference with a child's access to medical
treatment during or shortly after birth. Delays could also preclude a child
from inheriting from the child's legal parents should a legal parent die
intestate before a declaration of parentage, perhaps leaving support and
rights in limbo.5 6
53. See id. (finding that adoption law applies when there is genetic connection
but does not when there is no genetic connection, as in gestational surrogacy
arrangement).
54. See Culliton, 756 N.E.2d at 1137-38 (stating adoption law only applies when
birth mother is related to child).
55. See id. at 1135 (ordering hospital to place genetic parents on birth certifi-
cate); see also Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 768 (Ohio 1994) (authorizing place-
ment of names of intended parents on birth certificate of child carried by
gestational surrogate). In Smith v. Brown, a case involving similar issues, the court
was asked to rule on the parenthood issue in an uncontested gestational surrogacy
case in which all relevant parties sought a declaration of their rights, but the court
discharged the trial judge's report of the case on procedural grounds. 718 N.E.2d
844, 845-46 (Mass. 1999).
56. See Culliton, 756 N.E.2d at 1139 (discussing problems with not declaring
who is parent of child). See asoJaqueline Ceurvels, Reproductive Medicine and Legal
Parentage: Breaking the Silence on the Legal Rights of Genetic & Gestational Parents-
Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 491, 491-92
(2001) (discussing Culliton decision).
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C. Legal Parenthood-The Case for an Intent-Based Approach
Parentage issues become convoluted when couples decide to donate
their extra embryos. The purpose of a couple undergoing IVF treatments
is to create embryos and produce children to raise. Initially, the couple
intends to retain parental rights over children resulting from the IVF treat-
ments. When a couple completes its family, however, both anticipated
and unanticipated decisions need to be made about any extra cry-
opreserved embryos. When a couple decides to donate surplus embryos to
another infertile couple, the intent to retain parental rights logically
ceases. This change of intent of the progenitor couple should be memori-
alized in a contract that explains and protects the rights of all involved
parties.
Prior to the development of assisted conception techniques, the birth
mother was considered the legal mother of any child she bore and, if she
was married, her husband was presumed to be the legal father. Although
this traditional model happens to coincide with the intent of the parties in
an embryo donation scenario (because the birth/intended mother would
be considered the legal mother) it does not coincide with most assisted
reproductive scenarios. Under the traditional model, for example, a tradi-
tional surrogate is considered the legal mother because she bears the
child, even though it is not her intention to be the legal mother.57 A
traditional adoption follows, permitting the surrogate to relinquish her
parental rights after the birth for the benefit of the intended parents.
In a gestational surrogacy arrangement, a woman serves as the "car-
rier" of a child conceived in vitro with the fertilized ovum of another wo-
man and gives birth to a child that is not biologically related to her. The
intent of this arrangement is that any resulting child is for the benefit of a
donee couple, and is not intended to be the child of the birth mother.
The intended parents can be the genetic parents. 58 Alternatively, the in-
tended parents might have no genetic connection with the embryo, if that
embryo was produced in vitro with gametes provided by donors other than
the intended parents. 59 In gestational surrogacy arrangements, the birth
mother and genetic mother are not the same woman, forcing the courts to
decide who the legal parents are. The existence of gestational surrogacy
arrangements forced the law to reconsider the application of the tradi-
tional birth mother rule, which only serves to frustrate the intentions of
the parties in many assisted reproduction scenarios. The new Uniform
57. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1253 (NJ. 1988) (holding that genetic
mother surrogate was legal mother of child).
58. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 789 (explaining that embryo implanted in uterus
of surrogate was produced in vitro using gametes of intended parents).
59. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 284 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1998) (ruling that intended parents were legal parents even though neither
had genetic connection to child and wife was not birth mother). In that case, the
ovum and sperm of third-party donors were used to produce an embryo in vitro to
be implanted in the surrogate. See id.
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Parentage Act (U.P.A.) carves out exceptions for establishing parentage in
assisted reproduction.
The U.P.A. recites the traditional rule that a woman giving birth to a
child establishes maternity, 60 but creates an exception for a child con-
ceived through an approved and legally recognized gestational surrogacy
agreement. 6' A state statute that presumes a child born of a surrogate is
the legal child of the intended parents6 2 would partially achieve the goal
of the U.P.A., but of itself does not create a comprehensive method of
resolving all the problems that surrogacy can create. Even if a state does
not enact the U.P.A., however, the courts will have to carve out an excep-
tion to the traditional birth mother rule in gestational surrogacy litigation
on a case-by-case basis. It is likely that the exception will be framed in light
of the parties' intent in entering the arrangement.
Several decades ago, some commentators predicted that advanced re-
productive technology would someday present major challenges to the
law. 63 That day has now arrived, and issues created by the no longer theo-
retical debate are now being litigated in the courts and discussed in the
legislatures. The various forms of assisted reproduction now available
have essentially nullified former legal perceptions of parenthood based on
biology or gestation alone. An intent-based model toward legal
parenthood is the only model that survives as reproductive science fast
outpaces the law. Under the intent-based theory to legal parenthood, the
parties who intend to rear the child are the legal parents. The theory
cannot be defeated if the parties' intentions are stipulated in a carefully
drafted, legally binding contract that is recognized by applicable law.
60. See UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 201 (a) (1), 9B U.L.A. 309 (2000) (describing
what constitutes mother-child relationship).
61. See id. § 201 (a) (4) (illustrating exception to § 201 (a) (1)). Article 8 of the
U.P.A. suggests a hearing to validate a gestational agreement to declare the in-
tended parents the legal parents of a child born pursuant to the agreement. See id.
§ 802; see also Michael Morgan, The New Uniform Parentage Act, 25 FAm. Anvoc., Fall
2002, at 11, 13 (commenting on gestational agreements in new U.P.A). The draft-
ers of the new U.P.A. eliminated the word "surrogacy" as being confusing and
proposed the use of the term "gestational agreement." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT pref-
atory cmt. to Article 8, 9B U.L.A. 360 (2002). A few states have enacted statutes
that exempt surrogacy agreements from the adoption law provision, which makes
it a crime to receive compensation for child selling. See, e.g., AlA. CODE § 26-10A-
34 (1991) ("Surrogate motherhood is not intended to be covered by this sec-
tion."); IowA CODE § 710.11 (1989) (excluding surrogate mothers from punish-
ment); W. VA. CODE § 48-22-803(e) (3) (2001) (excluding fees paid to woman to be
surrogate mother).
62. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (Michie 2002) (excepting surrogate
mothers as legal parents). But see UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801, 9B U.L.A. at 362
(stating that Uniform Parentage Act adopts "intended parent" rule in gestational
agreements).
63. See generally Charles P. Kindregan, State Power over Human Fertility and Indi-
vidual Liberty, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 140-41 (1972) (predicting problems with reproduc-
tive technology and law).
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The intent-based model toward legal parenthood has already been
applied in several noteworthy decisions. In Johnson, the California court
honored the intent of the parties. The court declared that the parents
who intended to rear the child were the legal parents even though the
wife was not the birth mother. 64 The Johnson court confronted a parent-
age contest between the Calverts, the gamete providers, and Johnson, the
gestational surrogate mother who contractually agreed to carry the child
for them.65 The court considered the intent of the parties the critical fac-
tor in resolving the dispute because the parties intended for the Calverts
to rear any resulting child and but for that surrogacy plan the child would
not have been born. 66 It followed that the intent of the Calverts to have a
child trumped any parental right Johnson may have acquired due to the
bond she formed with the child during gestation. 6 7 The Johnson court de-
termined that under California law, she who intends to raise the child is
the natural mother:
Although the Act recognizes both "genetic consanguinity and giv-
ing birth as a means of establishing a mother and child relation-
ship, when the two means do not coincide in one woman, she
who intended to procreate the child-that is, she who intended
to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as
her own-is the natural mother under California law."
68
In the opinion of the authors, Johnson was correctly decided and the
intent theory should also apply to an embryo donation scenario. The
transfer of an embryo creates a biological mother and a birth mother.
They are two different women, but both cannot be the legal mother. 69 In
64. SeeJohnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) ("She who intended
to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own-is the
natural mother.").
65. See id. at 778 (discussing surrogacy arrangements); see also Susan Frelich
Appleton, "Planned Parenthood": Adoption, Assisted Reproduction and the New Ideal Fam-
ily, 1 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 85, 88 (1999) (discussing Johnson).
66. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 ("But for their acted-on intention, the child
would not exist.").
67. See id. (stating that Johnson's change of heart should not change
outcome).
68. Id.
69. In Johnson, the American Civil Liberties Union argued as amicus curiae
that the court should recognize both the egg donor and the surrogate as the
mothers. See id. at 781 n.8. The court rejected this as impractical as it would create
competing parental rights in a third party. See id. In Michael H. v. Gerald D., the
United States Supreme Court rejected a constitutional claim by a child whose legal
father under state law was the husband of her mother that she had a right to have
two fathers, the other being her biological father. 491 U.S. 110, 131 (1989). The
concept of a de facto parent opens the door to a kind of dual motherhood in
which a non-parent who has functioned as a mother with the consent of the biolog-
ical mother could gain custody or visitation rights. See E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711
N.E.2d 886, 893-94 (Mass. 1999) (ruling that de facto mother is allowed to visit
with child over mother's objections after relationship between women dissolved).
Disputes between two women claiming to be the mother of a child date to Biblical
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the context of a gestational surrogacy situation, the intended mother
should be considered the legal mother because she intended to raise the
resulting child as her own. Likewise, in an embryo adoption scenario, the
embryo recipient/birth mother should be considered the legal mother to
remain consistent with the intent-based model of legal parenthood.
In addition to protecting the rights of the parents, the application of
the intent-based model also protects the child. In In re Marriage of Buz-
zanca,70 for example, a California court ruled against an intended father
who tried to avoid his child support obligation. The man and his wife
arranged to have an embryo that was genetically unrelated to either of
them implanted in a gestational surrogate. When the child was born, the
husband and wife were divorcing and the husband disclaimed any finan-
cial responsibility for the child. He argued that an absence of a biological
connection to the child relieved him of any support obligation.71 Revers-
ing the trial judge who had (remarkably) ruled that the child had no par-
ent, the California Court of Appeals identified the couple who had
planned to rear the child as the legal parents, emphasizing "the intelli-
gence and utility of a rule that looks to intentions."72 The need for some
rule in embryo donation cases is apparent because, as the California court
commented, "[tihese cases will not go away." 73 Certainly, a strong argu-
ment can be made that the rule should require that parental status should
"depend upon the preconception intent of the parties." 74
A New York appellate court decided Perry-Rogers v. Fasano,75 which
grew out of a tragic mistake involving an embryo transfer. 76 Two couples
were participating in IVF. An embryo of an African-American couple was
mistakenly implanted in the uterus of a Caucasian woman. The Caucasian
woman delivered two children; one African-American and the other Cau-
casian. The Caucasian child was the birth mother's genetic offspring; the
times. See 1 Kings 3:25-26 (describing controversy between two mothers over one
child). King Solomon's solution to the dispute was effective, but would not work
in a modern court.
70. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
71. See id. at 283 (explaining that wife accepted parental responsibility for
child and surrogate birth mother appeared in case and disclaimed any interest in
child).
72. Id. at 290; see also Appleton, supra note 65, at 89 (discussing Buzzanca).
73. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 293 (referring to legal cases growing out of
use of modern reproductive technology).
74. John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a "Parent"? The Claims of Biology
as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 415 (1991). Hill argues that
the law refers to intent in many areas and that it is especially useful to do so when
the intended parents are the "first cause, or prime movers, of the procreative rela-
tionship." Id.
75. 715 N.Y.S.2d 19 (App. Div. 2000) (holding that birth mother did not have
visitation rights to child that was accidentally placed in her womb during an IVF
procedure).
76. See Raizel Liebler, Are You My Parent? Are You My Child? The Role of Genetics
and Race in Defining Relationships After Reproductive Technological Mistakes, 5 DEPAUL
J. HEALTH CARE L. 15, 42-52 (2002) (including analysis of Perry-Rogers decision).
2004]
15
Kindregan and McBrien: Embryo Donation: Unresolved Legal Issues in the Transfer of Surpl
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
other child was produced from the embryo of the African-American
couple. After considerable dispute between the couples, the African-
American child was delivered to its genetic parents, but the Caucasian
couple wanted legal visitation with the child. The court ruled for the ge-
netic African-American parents in denying visitation, essentially ruling that
the genetic parents were the intended parents. The court, however, did
not rely primarily on the genetic connection. 7 7 The court noted that if
this had been a custody dispute rather than a visitation dispute, it would
have awarded custody to the African-American parents because they had
arranged for their genetic material to be taken and cryopreserved in an
attempt to produce a child of their own.
78
An earlier New York decision illustrates the greater importance of in-
tent over genetics as a basis for legal parenthood. A woman became preg-
nant with a donor ovum fertilized with her husband's sperm. When the
couple divorced, the husband argued that he had a superior right to cus-
tody of the child because he was the genetic parent while his wife had no
genetic connection to the child. The court rejected this argument. Be-
cause both husband and wife intended to become parents, they had equal
standing as parents even though the wife was not the biological mother of
the child.
79
The authors advocate applying the intent-based model to legal
parenthood, which emerged in gestational surrogacy cases, to embryo do-
nation cases. Although the traditional birth mother rule coincidentally
works for embryo donation, an intent-based model should apply across the
board to protect the rights of all parties involved, including the children.
80
As in gestational surrogacy cases, and pursuant to the Massachusetts hold-
ing in Culliton, all parties involved could document their intentions in a
contract and obtain a declaration of legal parentage prior to the birth of
any resulting child.8 1 Such a declaratory judgment would resolve the
77. The court noted, however, that genetics are not entirely irrelevant and
that with "current reproductive technology, the term 'genetic stranger' can no
longer be enough to end a discussion." Perry-Rogers, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 23.
78. See id. at 24 (stating that even if Fasano sought custody, child would be in
custody of Rogers).
79. See McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 478 (App. Div. 1994) (stat-
ing that gestational mother is natural mother).
80. But see Helen M. Alvare, The Case for Regulating Collaborative Reproduction: A
Children's Rights Perspective, 40 HA,v. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (2003) (arguing that child's
rights are best protected by government regulation or collaborative assisted repro-
duction); Kermit Roosevelt III, The Newest Property: Reproductive Technologies and the
Concept of Parenthood, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 79, 91-96 (1998) (challenging utility
of intent-based rule and proposing property-based approach to establishing legal
parenthood).
81. See Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1139
(Mass. 2001) (stating that parentage can be determined in pre-birth declaratory
action and that genetic/intended parents in gestational surrogacy arrangements
are legal parents). This determination should also apply in an embryo adoption
scenario so that the intended parents (that is, the donee couple) can be adjudi-
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problem of the donor couple potentially retaining parental rights when
donating embryos. It is precisely at the time of donation of the embryo,
when the parties are all in agreement, that an uncontested declaratory
judgment action would be most effective. Resolving the respective rights
and liabilities of the parties after a child is born would leave too many
potential disputes to be resolved.8 2
While the authors advocate the intent-based model of legal
parenthood to assisted conception scenarios, it is important to note that
only the traditional birth mother model should apply to natural concep-
tion. For example, a man who mistakenly impregnates a woman should
not be able to invoke his lack of intent to bring a child into the world to
avoid support obligations.8 3 In such circumstances, the intent of the par-
ties is irrelevant and the traditional birth mother rule and presumption
that her husband is the legal father should apply. The intent-based model
to legal parenthood is appropriately applied to assisted reproduction sce-
narios, but not to natural forms of conception. Existing case law does, and
any new statutes should, reflect the fundamental differences and purposes
in natural versus assisted conception.
D. Are Emnbyos Property, Persons or in an Interim Category?
Property rights include the rights to control, possess, use, exclude,
profit from and dispose of assets. 84 Property rights complicate an analysis
of embryo donation. While blood, hair, semen, eggs, teeth and skin are
routinely donated without causing legal problems, the issue becomes
more complicated when dealing with an embryo because two people,
rather than one, have equal rights to it.8 5 The law treating human body
cated the legal parents prior to birth, even though they are not the genetic
parents.
82. 82. SeeJaeger, supra note 12, at 10 (clarifying that legal parentage prior to
child's birth provides stability for that child from moment of birth by establishing
custodial rights and determining who may make medical decisions on behalf of
child).
83. See id. at 8 (stating that boundaries must be drawn to combat attempted
application of new law to accidental pregnancies); see also Pamela P. v. Frank S.,
449 N.E.2d 713, 714 (N.Y. 1983) (stating that father cannot raise as defense in
paternity matter that mother had defrauded him into believing she was using con-
traception prior to their having sexual intercourse during which child was
conceived).
84. See BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1233 (7th ed. 1999) (defining property); see
also Barry Brown, Reconciling Property Law with Advances in Reproductive Science, 6
STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 73, 75 (1995) (discussing property rights in organs and tis-
sues); Roosevelt, supra note 80, at 80 (analyzing body as property).
85. See Roosevelt, supra note 80, at 82 (noting body parts that can be trans-
ferred); see also Brown, supra note 84, at 77 (questioning whether embryos should
be treated as property of one or other of decedent's' estates or whether embryos
should be divided as if each decedent was tenant in common whether both gamete
providers die simultaneously).
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parts, tissues and fluids as property is less than clear.8 6 The American So-
ciety for Reproductive Medicine has taken the position that gametes and
concepti are the property of the donors.8 7 But while the law allows some
right of donation in the products of one's body, it does not treat human
reproductive material as mere property.8 8 One commentator distin-
guishes a couple's right to sell its gametes from its right to sell other types
of personal property:
The fact that it is appropriate for people to regard gametes as the
possession of the provider in the sense that no one (including
the government and medical research facilities) may comman-
deer them does not mean, however, that a gamete provider has
the right to sell that material .... The liberal ideal of "self own-
ership" does not mean that we can do whatever we like with all
our body parts.8 9
Accordingly, at least one commentator believes that treating gametes as
"commodities" is the "wrong way to conceptualize human beings' relation-
ships to their genetic material." 90
In Davis v. Davis,9 1 a Tennessee divorce appeal, the court grappled
with how to decide a contest between a divorced couple over the disposi-
tion of its cryogenically preserved embryos. 9 2 The court did not classify
embryos as persons because embryos have not been born, or even im-
planted, or developed to the stage of viability. This accords with the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of personhood in a constitu-
86. See generally Rubenstein, supra note I (containing extensive analysis of in-
consistent attempts to resolve disputes over body parts, fluids, tissues, etc.).
87. See Ethical Statement on In Vitro Fertilization, 46 FERTILITY & STERILITY 89S,
App. E (1986) (discussing ethical requirements couples must follow when choos-
ing in vitro fertilization). The right of a person to sell property is an ordinary
incident of ownership, but the American Society for Reproductive Medicine limits
payment to ova donors to compensation for inconvenience, time, discomfort and
risk, not the value of the donated ova. SeeJay A. Soled, The State of Donors' Eggs: A
Case of Why Congress Must Modify the Capital Asset Definition, 32 U.C. DAv1s L. REv.
919, 949 (1999) (noting that in reality ova donors are paid for their eggs and they
should receive preferential tax treatment under capital asset definition of tax
code).
88. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr Act § 2, 8A U.L.A. 33 (1987) (providing for
organ donation, but stopping short of endorsing property concept in human body
parts through restrictions and prohibiting sales); see also Nat'l Organ Transplant
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-74 (1944) (supporting organ donation, but prohibiting
sales); Rubenstein, supra note 1, at 386-88 (analyzing posthumous corporeal
rights).
89. Shanley, supra note 22, at 271 (arguing that gametes should not be treated
as individual marketable property).
90. Id. at 272 (concluding that conceptual model should be altered from one
of ownership of gametes to one of stewardship).
91. 842 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tenn. 1992) (discussing disposition of cry-
opreserved embryos represents question of first impression).
92. See id. (stating issue).
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tional sense as promulgated in Roe v. Wade.93 In Roe, the Supreme Court
interpreted the word person as used in the Constitution to exclude the
unborn.9 4 The Tennessee court in Davis also declined to consider em-
bryos as property because treating embryos as property would belittle their
potential for human life.9 5 The court created an "interim category" that
entitled the embryos "to special respect because of their potential for
human life."9 6 In deciding Davis, the court permitted the donors who
provided the genetic material that created the embryos to "retain decision-
making authority as to their disposition."9 7 While Davis rejected an out-
right property analysis, it held that the husband and wife whose gametes
were used to produce the embryo had an ownership interest at least to the
extent of having the right to determine disposition of the embryo.98
93. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding that fetus does not constitute "person" for
purposes of Fourteenth Amendment).
94. See Tracy Haslett,J.B. v. M.B.: The Enforcement of Disposition Contracts and the
Competing Interests of the Right to Procreate and the Right Not to Procreate Where Donors of
Genetic Material Dispute the Disposition of Unused Preembyos, 20 TEMP. ENv-rL. L. &
TECH. J. 195, 215 (2002) (noting that in abortion context United States Supreme
Court expressly rejected view that embryos are legal persons from moment of con-
ception) (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 113); see alsoJohn Harris, Embryos and Hedgehogs:
On the Moral Status of the Embryo, in EXPERIMENTS ON EMBRYOS 65, 68 (Anthony
Dyson & John Harris eds., 1990) (discussing complication of finding "beginning"
of human life). A fertilized egg cannot be considered a new individual because it
is possible that two weeks later it could split, creating twins. See id.
95. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595 ("[A]s embryos develop, they are accorded
more respect than mere human cells because of their burgeoning potential for
life. But, even after viability, they are not given legal status equivalent to that of a
person already born."); see also Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479
(Cal. 1990) (holding that man did not have property interest in his removed
spleen); Haslett, supra note 94, at 203 (finding most commentators believe that
embryos are neither persons nor property). Confusion over the property/person
distinction is reflected in the view of one commentator who wrote that "[a]lthough
embryos are legally chattel[,] the prenatal transfer of property is supplemented by
a home study and other processes that are characteristic of adoption." Crouch,
supra note 19, at 32.
96. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597 (holding pre-embryos are entitled to special re-
spect because of their potential for human life).
97. Id. at 597. The court concluded that in determining the disposition of
pre-embryos: (1) the first choice is the preferences of the progenitors, (2) if those
choices are in conflict or cannot be ascertained, a pre-existing agreement should
be consulted and honored, and (3) only if such an agreement does not exist
should the relative interests of the parties be considered, with the interest of the
party seeking to avoid procreation favored, unless the other party cannot achieve
parenthood by means other than utilization of the pre-embryos in question. See id.
at 604 (applying disposition analysis in finding that pre-embryos were to be dis-
posed of and neither party could use them to achieve parenthood).
98. See Samantha Hayden, The Ambiguous State of Cryogenically Preserved Embryos:
The Legacy of Davis v. Davis, 15 MAss. FAM. L.J. 91, 96 (1997) (summarizing decision
in Davis). While the embryos are frozen, both gamete donors have the same level
of interest in them. Haslett, supra note 94, at 211 (analyzing difference between
birth mother's relationship and donor's relationship to embryo).
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The Tennessee court declined to treat the product of human concep-
tion as mere property subject to division,9 9 and it appears unlikely that any
court will ever treat embryos simply as property subject to division under a
community property or equitable property divorce statute. Indeed, the
proponents of embryo adoption who believe that the products of concep-
tion have human existence are likely to raise the strongest objections to
treating embryos as mere property.
In A.Z. v. B.Z.,100 a Massachusetts court agreed with the Davis analysis,
at least with respect to the classification of cryopreserved embryos in an
interim category between personhood and property, ruling that embryos
are deserving of special respect.' 0 t According to the Massachusetts court,
the law treats cryopreserved embryos as something between persons and
property. An interim category is necessary because it enables the courts to
avoid having to apply two inapplicable areas of the law: the law of custody,
which applies only to children, and the law of personal property. There
are only a few decisions on the status of cryopreserved embryos, of which
A.Z. v. B.Z. reflects the prevailing view. 10 2
E. Embryo Adoption and the Implications for Abortion Rights
The use of the phrase "embryo adoption" might suggest that embryos
are persons with full legal rights like post-natal babies who are adopted in
the traditional manner. The Snowflake Agency promotes embryo adop-
tion and embraces its Christian pro-life stance in using the phrase embryo
adoption, in part, to elevate the status of the embryo to that of a per-
son.10 3 Such a view, however, is not consistent with the legal status of the
embryo. 104 Affording embryos the status of persons would erode the legal
theory on which the Supreme Court's abortion decisions are based. 10 5
The longer the process is called embryo adoption, and the more common
the phrase becomes, the more society may view embryos as persons enti-
99. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 591 (holding excess embryos resulting from 1VF
procedure are not property subject to equitable division).
100. 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000) (holding in divorce case that hus-
band could obtain injunction preventing wife from using or donating cry-
opreserved embryos).
101. See id. at 1059 (discussing policy rationales behind holding); see also King,
supra note 22, at 113 (noting that use of "special respect" category in A.Z v. B.Z
eliminated need to resolve dispute over embryos by using custody or property law
analysis).
102. See King, supra note 22, at 124 (" [T] he 'special respect' perspective is the
currently prevailing view on the legal status of frozen embryos .... ).
103. The Snowflake program is run by an organization known as Nightlight
Christian Adoptions. See A Tale of Two Families, supra note 17 (explaining opera-
tion of Snowflake program).
104. For a discussion of the prevailing legal view on the status of the embryo,
see supra notes 84-102 and accompanying text.
105. See Bush To Promote "Embryo Adoption", supra note 15 (explaining that ele-
vating status of embryo could support effort to roll back abortion rights by under-
mining theory of Roe v. Wade).
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tied to legal protection. This view would challenge the basic premise of
the right to choose abortion without state interference. Maintaining an
interim category for treating embryos somewhere between persons and
property will insulate abortion rights from legal attack on the basis that
embryos are persons.
F. Ensuring the Dignity of the Embryo
A continuous increase in the practice of embryo adoption will force
the development of legislative or court protocols to govern the adoption
procedure. For reasons discussed previously in this Article, the standards
developed should be consistent with the dignity or special respect con-
cepts and should not be based on existing adoption law, property law or
child custody/personhood law. Under such standards, couples with em-
bryos that were not used in their IVF treatments would be able to donate
them for use by an "adopting" couple, or person, as long as the innate
dignity of the embryos is preserved. In order to promote this dignity, the
donee couple must agree to assume responsibility for any child produced
by the IVF and adoption procedure. This includes assuming responsibility
for children born with genetic and/or physical abnormalities.
The law should also require a judicially pre-approved contract spell-
ing out such issues as the responsibility of the donee couple for child sup-
port. If the donor couple is to be allowed visitation with any resulting
child, this should also be covered in the agreement. As to both child sup-
port and visitation, however, a court (not the contract) will have final
power to resolve any disputes.
The argument might be made that the dignity of the embryo should
preclude commercial sales. While embryos are not children in the legal
sense, some will be offended by the idea that businesses could participate
in the selling of human embryos. Nevertheless, the reality is that commer-
cialization of the embryo market is inevitable, given the already common
practice of selling ova and sperm. 10 6 But even aside from the reality that
simple demand for embryos will inevitably invite commercialization in a
free market is the practical impossibility of drafting and enforcing laws
that would prevent it. Clinics would find ways to compensate donors for
their time, pain, inconvenience, travel, medical and other expenses and
charge "service fees" that in total would amount to considerable amounts
and, thus, avoid the stigma associated with outright sales of embryos. The
106. See Shanley, supra note 22, at 257 (citing payments to egg providers);
Karen Springen & David Noonan, Sperm Banks Go Online, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 21, 2003,
at E14 (citing sales of sperm over Internet). One example of the commercializa-
tion of assisted reproduction technology is a radio commercial used in Washing-
ton, D.C. area traffic reports that proclaims, "Genetics and IVF Institute of
Virginia. Have a baby or your money back. Guaranteed." Alvare, supra note 80, at
2 (discussing frequent use of new reproductive technologies).
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Snowflake Agency, for example, promotes embryo adoption, 1° 7 and it col-
lects a fee from the adopting parents.' 0 8 The Agency claims on its website
that the adopting parents' fee includes a home study, the matching of
couples, maintenance of files and preparation of legal documents. Such
justification for fees avoids the stigma that the Agency is involved in facili-
tating the sale of embryos between one couple and another. 10 9 Justifying
fees also permits clinics to avoid the language in some state statutes that
might be interpreted to prohibit the payment of money for the transfer of
cryopreserved embryos. 110
While egg-donation and surrogacy agreements routinely and justifia-
bly provide reimbursement for "inconvenience, time, discomfort, and for
the risk undertaken," any payment transactions involved in the transfer of
donated embryos might be considered suspect. II' In comparison to egg
donations, which involve medical care and inconvenience to the donor,
arguably justifying payment of fees, donation of already-produced cry-
opreserved embryos requires no further medical treatment for the donors.
Therefore, anything other than a reasonable fee for matching couples in
an embryo donation might be considered highly suspect and violative of
statutes prohibiting the sale of embryos. Even if anti-commercialization
legislation was drafted and enforced, however, it would likely encounter
constitutional problems as constituting a restriction on the "presumptive
primacy of procreative liberty."' 1 2 Certainly there are many that would
argue that any governmental attempt to prevent access to reproductive
technology capable of being marketed to infertile couples intrudes on fun-
damental liberty interests.
107. For a detailed story of an embryo match made by the Snowflake Agency,
see supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
108. See SNOWFLAKES Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.snowflakes.
org/FAQs.htm#aplO (last visited Apr. 17, 2003) (explaining fees and other com-
mon questions adopting and genetic parents have regarding embryo adoption).
109. See id. (listing reasons for program fees).
110. See ADOPTION AND REPRODUCrIvE TECHNOLOGY LAW IN MASSACHUSETrS
§ 10.3.8 (Susan Crockin ed., 2000) [hereinafter CROCKIN] (commenting that some
state statutes might be interpreted to prohibit sales of embryos).
111. Rubenstein, supra note 1, at 387 (discussing American Society for Repro-
ductive Medicine's position on fee arrangements for egg donors); see also Susan L.
Crockin, Collaborative Reproduction: An Invitation to Legislate, 72 FERTILITY & STERIL-
in" 5 (1999); Stolberg, supra note 16, at 01G (noting that egg donors are paid up to
$15,000, but donee of embryo has to pay only cost of embryo transfer, i.e., about
$3,000). Similar issues arise with respect to commercial sales of sperm on the In-
ternet. See Springen & Noonan, supra note 106, at E14 (discussing sale of gametes
on websites offering sperm produced by donors with certain physical appearances,
employment or religion).
112. See Naomi D. Johnson, Excess Embryos: Is Embryo Adoption a New Solution or
a Temporary Fix?, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 853, 879 (2003) (summarizing constitutional
theories that might be used to challenge government regulation of embryo dona-
tion); see also Radhika Rao, Assisted Reproduction Technology and the Threat to the Tradi-
tional Family, 47 HASTINc.S L.J. 951, 952 (1996) (presenting problems with assisted
reproductive technologies).
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G. Potential Obstacles to Embryo Donation
Even if there is no money or sale involved, some statutes might even
preclude the mere donation of embryos. For example, the Massachusetts
statute prohibits the sale, transfer, distribution or donation of embryos for
experimental purposes.1 13 Whether such statutes apply to embryo dona-
tion depends on whether the donation of embryos to treat infertility
amounts to "experimentation." Such a question is a specific statutory in-
terpretation for the courts to decide,1 14 although as IVF becomes more
accepted as a common medical procedure rather than an experimental
one, it becomes less and less likely that such treatment for infertility will be
considered "experimentation." Furthermore, in Massachusetts, some pro-
tection is offered to those experimenting with embryos. When a medical
procedure using embryos is contemplated, the institutional review board
can approve and document it. The protocol and approval can then be
submitted to the district attorney, where the documentation can serve as a
defense in any criminal action brought under the experimentation stat-
ute. 1 1 5 As long as some states maintain criminal statutes that arguably
could apply to LVF and embryo adoption, persons considering being em-
bryo donors, donees or intermediaries must carefully consider the poten-
tial criminal liability.
H. Who Is Eligible to Receive Donated Embryos?
It is blackletter law that the legal system should promote the best in-
terests of children. It must therefore be asked who should qualify as a
potential donee parent of surplus cryopreserved embryos. As a point of
reference, when an embryo donation issue reaches a court, judges might
initially apply the same principles that govern qualifying potential parents
in traditional adoptions.
In some jurisdictions, an unmarried person can legally adopt, and by
the same token, a single woman should be eligible for embryo "adoption."
Single women who want to parent alone now routinely employ artificial
insemination by donor sperm to get pregnant. Following this trend, it is
likely that single women will have a legally recognized right to gestate an
"adopted" embryo. There is no longer a stigma attached to nonmarital
children being raised in single-parent homes, and it is unlikely that legisla-
113. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 12J (West 1996) ("No person shall
knowingly sell, transfer, distribute or give away any fetus for a use which is in viola-
tion of the provisions of this section."). For purposes of this statute the word "fe-
tus" includes an embryo or neonate. See id. Conviction for violation of the statute
can be punished both by fine and imprisonment. See id. For a list of state laws
prohibiting research on embryos and payments for embryos, see Table III: State
Laws on Embryo Research and Commercialization, at http://www.kentlaw.edu/islt/TA-
BLEIII.htm (last visited May 24, 2003).
114. See CROCKIN, supra note 110, § 10.3.5 (discussing different interpretation
of statutes prohibiting experimentation on embryos).
115. See MAss. GEN LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 12J(a)(VI) (1996).
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tures will intervene in fruitless attempts to prohibit use of donated em-
bryos by unmarried women." 16
When IVF first emerged, only couples medically proven to be infertile
could use the service." 7 Now the standards are more lenient and a show-
ing of idiopathic infertility should suffice.' 18 The law is unlikely to impose
an infertility standard as a prerequisite to "adopting" surplus embryos.
Given the trend with IVF, it is unlikely that the service will be limited to a
certain genre of people. In many states, such as Massachusetts, same-gen-
der couples can adopt, and, therefore, same-gender couples would be eli-
gible embryo donees." 9 An attempt to exclude same-gender couples
and/or singles from adopting embryos is unlikely to withstand judicial
scrutiny. A legal requirement for racial matching between donors and do-
nees would be constitutionally unenforceable, as would a judicial enforce-
ment of a racial-matching contract governing embryo transfer. However,
even if not specifically enforceable in a court of law, a private arrangement
to provide a racial match would presumably not offend the law.120
I. Embryo Creation
Another consideration is whether couples will be able to intentionally
create embryos for other couples. Initially, embryo donation surfaced as a
solution for the existence of thousands of surplus cryopreserved em-
bryos. 1 2 1 Now, however, couples can create custom-made embryos. 122
116. See Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional Family,
92 UTAH L. REV. 158, 189 (1996) ("With more than one in four children bom out
of wedlock, society today attaches little if any stigma to one's status as a nonmarital
child.").
117. See George J. Annas, Commentaries, Human Cloning: A Choice or an Echo,
23 DAYrON L. REv. 247, 260 (1998); see also International Council on Infertility
Information Dissemination, A Glossary of Infertility Terms and Acronyms, at http://
www.inciid.org/glossaryijk.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2001). Infertility is "[t]he in-
ability to conceive after a year of unprotected intercourse in women under 35, or
after six months in women over 35, or the inability to carry a pregnancy to term.
Also included are diagnosed problems such as an ovulation, tubal blockage, low
sperm count, etc." Id.
118. See A Glossary of Infertility Terms and Acronyms, supra note 117 (defining
infertility). A few states, including Florida, New Hampshire and Virginia, continue
to limit the use of surrogacy to infertile couples. For a complete list of surrogacy
laws, see Table IV. State Laws on Surrogacy, at http://www.kentlaw.edu/islt/TABLE
IV.htm (last visited May 24, 2003).
119. See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 318 (Mass. 1993) (holding that
adoption statute does not preclude same-gender joint adoption).
120. For a discussion of private eugenic arrangements, see infra notes 166-79
and accompanying text.
121. Some patients were notified that clinics no longer wanted to store their
embryos and some patients who had religious or moral objections to discarding
them chose to donate them to other infertile couples. See generally Cooper &
Glazer, supra note 15 (discussing how embryo adoption started).
122. See Embryo Adoption, supra note 15 (explaining made-to-order embryos).
A best-interests-of-the-parents approach will supercede a best-interests-of-the-child
approach if eugenic embryo creation is permitted. See id. But see Alvare, supra note
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While embryo donation refers to the donation of an existing embryo, em-
bryo creation involves creating embryos with donated or purchased ga-
metes. 123 Embryo creation is attractive to couples who lack viable gametes
and to those who may favor custom-making their embryos to enhance ge-
netic selection. Embryo creation enables couples to create embryos from
the gametes of hand-picked donors.12 4 Without a doubt, embryo creation
will fuel heated ethical debates over whether the procedure is tantamount
to creating children for adoption or whether it is merely a logical and
inevitable extension of single gamete donation. 125
Documentation shows that couples have created embryos through
IVF for the sole purpose of using the resulting child to save an existing
child. 126 Jack and Lisa Nash's first child, Molly, was born with Fanconi
anemia (FA), a rare genetic disease that leaves the inflicted vulnerable to
breakdown of bone marrow and at risk for infection and leukemia. The
Nashes learned that they both carried a mutation for FA in the same gene
and that their children would have a one-in-four chance of developing FA.
They also learned that the only way to save Molly was to get her a bone
marrow transplant. They underwent IVF with therapeutic intent. The
procedure involved creating embryos with their gametes, genetically test-
ing and discarding those embryos with the feared mutation and im-
planting only healthy embryos. As a result, Adam was born and Molly was
cured using blood drained from Adam's umbilical cord. Creating Adam
to save Molly raised an ethical debate, but the practice will no doubt be
repeated. Presumably, couples like the Nashes have paved the way for fu-
ture use of embryo creation as a means of addressing medical
problems. 127
J. Post-birth Contact Between Donor and Child
In recent years there has been growing interest in the theory of "open
adoption." 128 This theory refers to the fact that subject to the right of
80, at 1 (arguing that potential to make pre-designed child by embryo selection is
valid reason for government regulation of assisted reproduction, as distinguished
from coital reproduction).
123. See generally Cooper & Glazer, supra note 15 (defining both embryo crea-
tion and embryo donation).
124. See generally id. (describing benefits of embryo creation).
125. See generally id. (describing controversy surrounding embryo creation).
126. See David Wasserman, Having One Child to Save Another: A Tale of Two
Families, 23 PHIL. & PUB. POL'v Q. 21 (2003) (explaining how some families use IVF
to have child in order to save existing child from dying because IVF guarantees
bearing child with compatible tissue); Gurney Williams III, Made to Order Baby,
PARENTING, June/July 2001, at 100 (discussing conception of child to produce tis-
sue donor to save earlier-born child).
127. See Williams, supra note 126, at 100 (detailing Nash's story).
128. See generally Annette Ruth Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption: Im-
plications for Collaborative Adoption Law and Practice, 75 B.U. L. REv. 997, 1013-20
(1995) (discussing utility of open adoption); Lawrence W. Cook, Open Adoption:
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final decision-making in the adoptive parents, legislation 129 or court rul-
ings, 1 3 0 some form of post-adoption visitation exists between the child and
its biological parents. The Snowflake Agency, for example, encourages
open adoption and most likely leaves visitation arrangements up to the
couples who use the service. Because embryo "adoption" is not legal adop-
tion, statutes and case law applying open adoption rules do not expressly
apply. Nothing bars the parties from entering into a visitation contract
enabling the embryo donors to visit with any resulting child. A court, how-
ever, may decline to enforce such an agreement. 13 1
Open embryo adoption arrangements can be fraught with difficulty.
Case law involving known sperm donors offers an analogous point of refer-
ence. Although donor insemination statutes exist in some states to protect
the rights of donors, they usually only apply to anonymous donors and/or
to married women or contemplate that the insemination be performed by
a physician. 13 2 Therefore, such statutes do not protect known sperm do-
nors and they may not even apply when anonymous donors donate to un-
married women or when women inseminate themselves without the
assistance of a physician. "1 3 In addition to the known donor's rights being
at stake, the donee's rights can also be compromised, as evidenced by
cases where known donors have successfully asserted parental rights.1 3 4
Courts have weighed factors such as the mother's marital status and the
existence of an agreement between the parties when determining a do-
Can Visitation with Natural Family Members Be in the Child's Best Interest?, 30 J. FAM. L.
471 (1991-92) (discussing open adoption).
129. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 210, § 6C (West Supp. 2003) (authorizing
court approval of written agreement between biological parents and adoptive par-
ents for post-adoption contact or communication).
130. See Adoption of Vito, 728 N.E.2d 292, 298-99 (Mass. 2000) (providing in
dictum that court hearing adoption petition may employ its equity powers to pro-
vide for post-adoption visitation with biological parents).
131. For a story on open embryo adoption, see supra notes 17-23 and accom-
panying text.
132. See Brashier, supra note 116, at 191 n.326 (noting states allowing artificial
insemination for married women, anonymous donors or by physician); Table I: Ar-
tificial Insemination Donation, at http://www.kentlaw.edu/islt/TABLEI.htm (last vis-
ited May 24, 2003) [hereinafter Table 1] (listing states with donor insemination
statutes).
133. See Brashier, supra note 116, at 191 n.326 (describing difficulty with ab-
sence of artificial insemination statutes). Prior to the enactment of New Jersey's
artificial insemination statute, a known sperm donor who provided sperm to an
unmarried woman was considered the legal father, even if that was not his original
intention. See C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821, 824 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1977)
(holding that friend of unmarried woman who donated sperm for artificial insemi-
nation is child's legal father).
134. See In re Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356, 357 (App. Div. 1994),
motion for stay granted, 650 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1995) (holding agreement between
known gay sperm donor and lesbian birth mother to terminate his parental rights
unenforceable).
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nor's parental rights.' 3 5 Although the existence of an open embryo adop-
tion contract would certainly help to clarify the interests of all the parties,
there is no guarantee that the original intent of the parties will be
honored in the event that one of the parties has a change of heart.
In the opinion of the authors, anonymous embryo donations resem-
bling the closed adoption system are less risky than having an open ar-
rangement. Some programs maintain the anonymity of embryo donors,
providing adopting parents with the gamete providers' medical informa-
tion only. 136 The statutes that exist in some states to extinguish the rights
and responsibilities of sperm donors could offer a point of reference for
couples who anonymously donate their embryos. Many states, for exam-
ple, have statutes that protect anonymous donors participating in artificial
insemination by nonspousal donors (AID). 13 7 Courts have construed
these statutes to mean that donors have no parental responsibilities and
that any resulting children have no right to inherit from their genetic fa-
ther, even if his identity is later discovered. 138 Such statutes were enacted
to protect donors from the possibility of facing paternity suits as a result of
their donations.' 39 Statutes similar to those that protect sperm donors
could be enacted for embryo donors, insulating donors from any later
claim by the donee parents or resulting children. In the absence of a stat-
ute governing the matter, a court faced with a dispute between donee par-
ents or resulting children against the gamete providers could reference
law dealing with anonymous sperm and egg donors. Although the deter-
mination of any outcome would be speculative at best, donors are more
likely to be protected in anonymous situations than in situations where the
donors are known.
If the legal status of the embryo donee is clarified by a post-birth
adoption of the child and if the state recognizes open adoption, the court
could construe that law to provide for visitation. While it would be ideal
135. See Brashier, supra note 116, at 191-92 (illustrating different factors that
courts use in determining donor's parental rights).
136. See Embyo Adoption, supra note 15 (discussing anonymous embryo
adoption).
137. See Brashier, supra note 116, at 189 (discussing AID statutes). The stat-
utes were enacted to define the rights and obligations of the parties when the
donor is anonymous. See id. For a list of states with donor insemination statutes,
see Table I, supra note 132.
138. See Brashier, supra note 116, at 190-91 (discussing how courts construe
AID statutes and extinguish all rights and responsibilities of anonymous donor); see
also, e.g., In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 33 (Colo. 1989) (noting that: (1) agreement be-
tween mother and donor was not considered in determining parental rights and
responsibilities where donor was anonymous; (2) anonymous donors likely would
not have donated semen if they could have later been found liable for support
obligations; and (3) women likely would not use anonymously donated semen if
they might have to share parental rights and duties with donor/stranger). For a
list of the twenty-two states where anonymous sperm donors are not the legal fa-
thers, see Table I, supra note 132.
139. Brashier, supra note 116, at 190 (discussing rights and obligations of
anonymous sperm donors as parents to resultant children).
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for courts to honor the intent of the parties with regard to visitation as
outlined in their pre-natal contract, it is doubtful that a court would en-
force it to compel visitation over the objections of the adoptive parents. 140
Moreover, requiring all recipient couples to proceed with traditional
adoption processes to terminate the rights of biological parents would be
administratively burdensome and could deter the development of embryo
donation. 14
1
In an ideal world in which embryo adoption flourished, the donor's
parental rights would be legally terminated upon embryo transfer. Also in
this ideal world, a declaration of legal parentage of the donees would be
permitted, allowing the names of the intended parents to be placed on a
birth certificate. Also, a hearing would be held to validate pre-birth con-
tracts, as the new U.P.A. suggests, and such contracts would be enforcea-
ble. If such procedural steps were permitted by the law to ensure the
enforceability of a pre-birth contract, it is more likely that a court would
enforce any visitation arrangement stipulated in that contract. The prob-
lem is that these are ideal solutions, but in most jurisdictions there is little
or no legal basis for them. It is unlikely that all state legislatures will move
to provide a statutory basis for pre-birth embryo contracts. Accordingly, it
will be left to the courts to gradually create procedures to deal with the
matter.
K. Inheritance Considerations
The debate over whether the intended parents, the biological parents
or the birth mother are the legal parents has obvious implications on the
inheritance rights of children resulting from reproductive technologies.
Before reproductive technologies existed, posthumously born children
were always born within approximately nine months of their biological fa-
thers' deaths. Such children are considered legal heirs and are entitled to
140. Generally parents have the right to exclude non-parents from visiting
their children. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72-73 (2000) (recognizing due
process rights of parents not to be compelled by courts to allow visitation with non-
parent such as grandparents). But see A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION § 2.03(1) (Tentative Draft No. 3, Part 1) (1998) (proposing to allow
de facto parents to visit children over parental objections in certain circum-
stances); Charles P. Kindregan, The Non-Traditional Family: Visitation and the New
Concept of the De Facto Parent, 17 MAss. FAm. L.J. 112, 114 (2000) (discussing situa-
tions in which non-parent may obtain court order for visitation).
141. In Massachusetts, where same-gender co-parent and step-parent adop-
tions are becoming increasingly common, the Probate and Family Courts now per-
mit motions to waive home studies and motions to waive the six month residency
requirements administratively. See Amy Joy Galatis, Can We Have a "Happy Family"?
Adoption by Same-Sex Parents in Massachusetts, 6 SUFFOLKJ. TRIAL & APP. ADvoc. 7, 13
(2001) (noting that Massachusetts courts routinely grants motions to waive home
study requirement). A Massachusetts state statute authorizes the court to waive the
home study and residency requirement when one of the petitioners is the parent
of the child being adopted, which is very common in same-gender adoptions and
step-parent adoptions. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 5A (West 1998).
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inherit from their fathers' estates. Cryopreservation technology for em-
bryos, however, permits the existence of "heirs" several years after the
death of either one or both genetic parents. The inheritance rights of
these children are far less certain than of those conceived through sexual
intercourse and born within nine months of their fathers' deaths.
Inheritance issues of potential heirs were presented in 1984, when an
American couple who had no will and a substantial fortune died in an
airplane accident two years after depositing fertilized ova in a clinic in
Australia. 14 2 The clinic storing the embryos was inundated with calls from
potential surrogates, attempting to cash in on potential inheritance rights
of any resulting children.'1 43 Since then, several cases have presented simi-
lar questions. For example, in the California case of Hecht v. Kane,14 4 the
former wife and children of a deceased man opposed the release of his
cryopreserved sperm to his mistress, to whom he had willed the gametes.
Furthermore, they sought a judicial order to destroy the sperm. On ap-
peal, the court ruled that no public policy prevented a single woman from
using sperm for post-mortem conception even if it were to extend the ad-
ministration of the estate pending possible conception and birth of
afterborn children.
In the Massachusetts case of Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Secur-
ity,145 the court determined that artificially conceived children born more
than nine months after their fathers' deaths may inherit under certain
circumstances. The court ruled that a posthumously conceived child may
inherit if the surviving parent or legal representative proves the decedent
is the genetic father of the child, the decedent affirmatively consented to
use of sperm for posthumous conception and the decedent consented to
142. See State of Victoria, supra note 7, at 741 (recommending restrictions on
embryo cryopreservation and donation); see also Constance Holden, Two Fertilized
Eggs Stir Global Furor, 225 ScI. 35 (1984) (explaining that Maria and Elsa Rios died
in plane crash, leaving significant fortune and no will).
143. See Holden, supra note 142, at 35 (explaining issue was further compli-
cated because sperm used was not husband's).
144. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 289-90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that artificial
insemination with decedent's sperm does not violate public policy).
145. 760 N.E.2d 257, 259-60 (Mass. 2002). After Lauren Woodward's hus-
band, Warren, was diagnosed with leukemia, the childless couple had Warren's
sperm medically withdrawn and preserved in case his leukemia treatment left him
sterile. See id. at 260. Warren died soon thereafter. See id. Two years later, Lauren
gave birth to twin girls conceived through artificial insemination using her de-
ceased husband's preserved sperm. See id. Subsequently, Lauren applied for So-
cial Security survivor benefits for her children, but was denied. See id. at 260-61.
The administrative law judge ruled that the children were not "ascertainable heirs
as defined by the intestacy laws of Massachusetts." See id. at 259. On certified ques-
tions submitted by the federal court to the state supreme court it was determined
that a posthumously conceived child may inherit from a decedent under certain
circumstances. See id.
2004]
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the support of any resulting child. 146 Even where such circumstances ex-
ist, however, time limitations may preclude a posthumously conceived
child's inheritance rights. 147
Clarification of inheritance rights of any resulting children is another
benefit to obtaining a declaration of legal parentage prior to the child's
birth in an assisted reproduction scenario. If such a declaration can be
obtained under applicable state procedure, legal parentage is established,
extinguishing any rights of the child to the estate of the embryo donors'
estates. Nevertheless, it is advisable for embryo donors to establish in their
wills their intent to exclude from inheritance any children resulting from
their donated embryos (if that is in fact what they wish). If a will does not
contain such language, it is possible that a resulting child could make a
claim against its biological parents' estates under a pretermitted child stat-
ute, which protects biological children who are not specifically provided
for in their parents wills. The law presumes that such children were left
out mistakenly and permits them to inherit, absent express language in
the will excluding them from inheriting. Therefore, in order to avoid
such claims, biological parents who donate their embryos should consider
expressly excluding children conceived by embryo donation in their wills.
Intestacy laws govern the estates of those embryo donors who die
without wills. For example, under the Massachusetts intestacy statute, if a
decedent leaves issue, the issue inherits a fixed portion of his real and
personal property, subject to debts and expenses, the rights of the surviv-
ing spouse and other statutory payments. 148 The term "issue" means all
lineal (genetic) descendants, which includes children resulting from the
embryos produced by the gametes of the deceased person. Furthermore,
the Massachusetts intestacy statute does not contain an express, affirmative
requirement that posthumous children must "be in existence" as of the
date of the decedent's death. 14 9 Arguably, children who come into exis-
tence after the deaths of their genetic parents could have a claim against
the estates of their parents when legal adoption of the children has not
occurred before their deaths. Furthermore, children born out of wedlock
are for the most part treated equally with marital children, and because
posthumous children born after their fathers' deaths are technically not
born in the marriage, 150 they are entitled to the same rights and protec-
146. See id. at 259 (stating surviving parent has to demonstrate genetic rela-
tionship between child and decedent, as well as demonstrate that decedent affirm-
atively consented to posthumous conception and subsequent support of child).
147. See id. (explaining that time limitations are sufficient to bar inheritance
rights even if surviving parent is able to demonstrate all requisite criteria for
support).
148. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 190, § 1 (West 1990) (discussing widow's
share of property not provided for in will).
149. See id. § 8 (stating that posthumous children are considered living at
death of parent).
150. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 209C, § 5(a) (West 1998) (stating that
when child's birth occurs within three hundred days of termination of marriage by
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tions of the law as children conceived before death.' 5 1 Although legisla-
tors did not anticipate such claims when they drafted intestacy statutes,
applying such laws to embryo donation would leave embryo donors' es-
tates subject to claims by any and all genetic children, except those
adopted after birth. Although the success of these types of claims is not
certain, couples considering donating their embryos should consider hav-
ing a will to negate any such possibility.
L. Misappropriation of Embryos
California has enacted a law making it a crime to misappropriate em-
bryos. 15 2 As a matter of first impression, one might think that imposition
of criminal liability for misusing embryos is unnecessary. However, em-
bryos have real financial value, and people desperate to have a birthed
child may pay substantial amounts of money for IVF without knowing that
the child they produce was actually generated by another couple. This
situation actually occurred at a clinic at the University of California at Ir-
vine. In 1995, it became public that ova produced by female patients were
being transferred to other patients for profit.1 53 Later it was learned not
only that ova were misused, but also that as many as five hundred couples
were potential victims of embryo misappropriation at the University
clinic. 15
4
M. Malpractice Liability
Whenever medical services are engaged there is potential tort liability
if those services are not performed at a level of due care and the patient is
injured by the act or omission. No reported malpractice cases to date in-
volve voluntary and consensual embryo adoption, but the potential for
malpractice in such cases is illustrated by cases involving other reproduc-
tive technologies.
Obviously, a physician who implants in another patient an embryo
produced by a couple without the couple's permission is exposed to finan-
cial liability. The lawsuits that grew out of the University of California at
father's death, statutory presumption of father's parentage applies and paternity of
child born after that period must be established by parentage judgment).
151. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 209C, § 1 (West 1998) (providing children
born out of wedlock are entitled to same protections as all other children).
152. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3 6 7g (1999) (making crime punishable by three,
four or five years, a $50,000 fine or both). For a description of California legisla-
tion and regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology ("ART") programs, see
Section IV Regulation and Oversight of ART Programs, at http://www.ucop.edu/health
affairs/reports/art/sec4.pdf (last visited May 24, 2003).
153. See Blum, supra note 2 (describing University of California at Irvine em-
bryo scandal).
154. See id. (reporting study of inventory, tank logs and other documents by
attorney for clinic patients).
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Irvine scanda 1 55 are testimony to that. Injuries to the couples whose eggs
or embryos were misappropriated include a lost ability to have children,
inability to raise the resulting child in their own religion when the em-
bryos were given to couples practicing a different religion and depression
from the belief that they have biological children they will never know. 15 6
A similar yet distinguishable situation exists when, without the knowl-
edge of a female patient, medical personnel fertilize her eggs with sperm
of a man other than her husband or male companion and then implant
the resulting embryo. Although it did not involve embryos, the infamous
case of Dr. Cecil Jacobson, who used his own sperm to impregnate his
artificial insemination patients rather than that of donors or husbands,
157
highlights a potential danger for misuse of gametes in the IVF process. An
incident in Florida also illustrates this danger: a Caucasian woman and her
African-American husband provided their eggs and sperm for the clinic to
fertilize in vitro as part of the IVF procedure. Subsequent DNA testing
showed that the twins born from this procedure were genetically related to
the wife only. The clinic used the sperm of someone other than the hus-
band to produce the embryos. 15 8 This resulted in a lawsuit against the
clinic, which was settled. Alleged damages included the loss of the chance
to have a child that was genetically related to both the husband and wife,
the consequent divorce of the couple and an agreement that the husband
was not liable for support of the children.' 59 Negligence in producing
and implanting embryos was also illustrated by the Perry-Rogers case dis-
cussed earlier in this Article, where a woman gave birth to two children of
different races. 160
Wrongful birth cases are also relevant. For example, in Viccaro v.
Milunsky, 1 6 1 a Massachusetts court ruled that a married couple who was
given negligent preconception genetic counseling could recover damages
for extraordinary medical and educational costs associated with the birth
155. For a discussion of the embryo scandal at the University of California at
Irvine, see supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
156. See Liebler, supra note 76, at 22 n.20 (summarizing various types of
claims growing out of University of California at Irvine fertility scandals).
157. See United States v. Jacobson, 4 F.3d 987 (4th Cir. 1993) (unpublished
table decision), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1069 (1995) (sentencingJacobson to five years
in prison and affirming his conviction).
158. See Liebler, supra note 76, at 37 (discussing details of Michael and Eliza-
beth Higgins).
159. See Liebler, supra note 76, at 37-44 (detailing reasons for settlement); see
also Sarah Lyall, British Judge Rules Sperm Donor Is Legal Father in Mix-Up Case, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 27, 2003, at A5 (requiring man whose sperm was mistakenly used to
fertilize eggs of woman undergoing IVF treatment to pay child support and giving
English couple custody of child, but granting sperm donor some input in raising
child).
160. For a further discussion of the facts of Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, see supra
notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
161. 551 N.E.2d 8 (Mass. 1990).
200 [Vol. 49: p. 169
32
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol49/iss1/4
EMBRYO DONATION
of a child with severe genetic defects. 162 The court reasoned that the
couple would not have had the child if the genetic counselors had in-
formed them of the serious risks of having a child with such defects.
163
There are clinics that provide embryos of anonymous donors for "adop-
tion" by couples seeking to have a child, 16 4 a scenario that raises the po-
tential of clinic liability in the selection and screening of gamete providers.
Case law suggests that reproductive clinics owe a duty of due care to screen
donors in surrogacy cases 165 and it follows that they would owe the same
duty of care in embryo adoption cases.
N. Eugenic Considerations
An argument could be made that state or federal regulations should
be enacted to control the transfer of embryos. Such regulations could be
based on the power to regulate health by requiring the testing of donors
of eggs, sperm or embryos before they are used in assisted human repro-
duction procedures. 166 Such regulations would be based on a negative
eugenics theory, such as limiting the dangers of transmission of disease or
genetically related disease to the donee and child. Initially, state law re-
stricting HIV-infected couples from using assisted reproductive technolo-
gies to have a child may have seemed like a sensible form of negative
eugenics given the danger of AIDS. The development of newer technolo-
gies for minimizing the chances of HIV transmissions, however, may now
result in an inference that such laws are unduly burdensome and perhaps
violative of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 167 The government has a
dismal record enacting legislation affecting human reproduction and the
danger exists that once the government gets involved in eugenic choices,
162. See id. at 9 (asserting wrongful life action against physician).
163. See id. at 11 (explaining that parents are owed duty of care in genetic
counseling and if that duty is breached, parents can recover in negligence). The
parents may also recover damages for emotional distress offset by emotional bene-
fits that the parents enjoy from the companionship of the child. See id. at 11-12.
164. See Embryo Adoption, supra note 15 (describing anonymous donor pro-
grams such as University of Iowa Health Center).
165. See Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261, 264 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding for-profit
surrogacy clinic liable for failure to screen sperm donors when sexually transmit-
ted disease was foreseeable risk and child conceived by procedure contracted
cytomegalis inclusion disease); see also Huddleston v. Infertility Ctr. of Am., Inc.,
700 A.2d 453, 460 (Pa. Super. 1997) (holding clinic owes surrogate mother and
child duty of protection from foreseeable risks).
166. New Hampshire became the first state to require by law that couples
undergoing in vitro fertilization must first submit to medical examinations. See
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:14 (2001) ("No gamete shall be used in an in vitro
fertilization or pre-embryo transfer procedure, unless the gamete donor has been
medically evaluated.").
167. See Lynn M. Zuchowski, The Americans with Disabilities Act-Paving the Way
for Use of Assisted Reproductive Technologies for the H1V-Positive, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REv.
185, 204-05 (2002) (discussing effect of statute on state laws in Illinois, Missouri
and California).
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it will become manipulative to produce certain socially or politically desira-
ble results.
In the first half of the twentieth century, the fear that the United
States would be overrun by incompetent children being born to incompe-
tent parents led many states to enact compulsory eugenic sterilization laws.
Under these laws, mentally retarded persons of child-bearing age could be
forcibly rendered infertile. 168 Notwithstanding the fact that the Nurem-
berg War Crimes Tribunal denounced the Nazi practice of using compul-
sory sterilization to prevent the birth of undesirable persons, an earlier
Supreme Court decision upholding this practice in the United States has
never been overruled.I 69 While it is unlikely that a modern American leg-
islature would enact a compulsory eugenics law regarding embryo trans-
fer, even a law limiting who may donate embryos based on eugenic factors
would be viewed by many as an unwarranted intrusion into an area where
private choice had previously held sway.
It is likely, however, that private eugenic arrangements will be attrac-
tive to some people. These may be based on a desire for children of a
particular gender,1 70 of a certain racer 7 ' or with other attractive character-
istics. 1 7 2 In traditional adoption scenarios, strong arguments have been
made for and against racial or ethnic matching. These arguments offer a
point of reference for embryo adoption. 1 73 The Indian Child Welfare Act,
for example, was enacted to limit the removal of Indian children from
their families and the placement of such children with non-Indian families
to prevent the deleterious effect of denying Indian children exposure to
168. See Charles P. Kindregan, Sixty Years of Compulsory Eugenic Sterilization:
"Three Generations of Imbeciles" and the Constitution of the United States, 43 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 123, 124 (1966) (surveying history and legal development of compulsory eu-
genic sterilization).
169. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding power of state to
compel sterilization of mentally retarded woman on eugenic grounds).
170. See Kenan Farrell, Where Have All the Young Girls Gone? Preconception Gender
Selection in India and the United States, 13 IND. INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 253, 265 (2002)
(noting use of abortion in India to eliminate female fetuses and that while this
practice is not common in the United States, potential for using new pre-concep-
tion reproductive technology to achieve gender selection without need for abor-
tion may increase gender selection here).
171. See Weiner & Andrews, supra note 34, at 16 (reporting college newspaper
advertisement for egg donor offering to pay $80,000 to Caucasian woman with SAT
score of about 1300). Expectations in regard to the appearance of a child may of
course exceed reality. The comment of the famous Irish wit George Bernard Shaw
should be recalled when he rejected the request of an attractive woman to bear his
child with the comment that the child might have her mind and his looks. See
WADLINGTON & O'BRIEN, supra note 7, at 697-98.
172. See Weiner & Andrews, supra note 34, at 16 (noting advertisement for
auction of donor eggs from fashion models on Internet to persons willing to pay
up to $150,000 in hopes of having physically attractive child).
173. See generally DOUGLAs E. ABRAMs & SARAH H. RAMsEy, CHILDREN AND THE
LAW 715-25 (2000) (discussing traditional arguments surrounding consideration of
race as determinative factor in adoptions).
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the ways of their people. 174 Furthermore, the National Association of
Black Social Workers opposes transracial adoption claiming it deprives
black children of their heritage.' 75 It is uncertain whether such opposi-
tion will exist with embryos, as it does with children. While a best interest
of the child approach may work for existing children, it might not be as
easily applied to potential children.
Further complicating the eugenics concerns are couples who attempt
to intentionally have a disabled child by using IVF and pre-implantation
genetic testing to ensure their children's genetic heritage reflects their
parents' disability. 1 76 A dwarf couple, for example, could use genetic test-
ing to implant only those embryos carrying the achondroplastic gene, so
as to ensure that the couple would have a dwarf child. 1 7 7 Likewise, a deaf
couple could make hearing choices for children by using pre-implantation
genetic diagnosis and embryo transfer.'7 s Such considerations present
questions such as whether being a dwarf and being deaf are disabilities
that compromise quality of life and, therefore, should not be purposefully
selected. 1 79 No matter what the law is or may be, some people will obvi-
ously make private attempts to achieve a eugenically desirable outcome in
egg, sperm and embryo donation.
0. Legislative Regulation and Political Considerations
Once the state becomes involved in regulating human reproduction,
the attractiveness of politically favored doctrines becomes a real danger.
History demonstrates this all too amply. The Federal Comstock Law180
reflected the Victorian anti-contraceptive attitudes and banned the intro-
duction of contraceptive devices and information into interstate com-
merce. The nineteenth century fear that the prevailing family order
174. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-63 (1978); see also ABRAMS & RAMSEY, supra note
173, at 93-94 (stating Congress has authority to control Native American affairs in
light of special responsibility America owes to Native Americans). An effort is
made to place Indian children in foster or adoptive homes that reflect Indian heri-
tage. See id. at 94.
175. See ABRAms & RAmsEx, supra note 173, at 718 (discussing position of Na-
tional Association of Black Social Workers that allowing non-black parents to adopt
black child is tantamount to cultural genocide).
176. DENA S. DAvis, GENETIC DILEMMAS 51-52 (2001) (detailing story of deaf
couple who wanted deaf child).
177. See, e.g., id. (describing how deaf couple could implant only those em-
bryos with genetic mutation).
178. See id. Connexin 26 is a recently discovered genetic mutation that is re-
sponsible for approximately half of all genetic deafness. See id. at 51. If both male
and female have the Connexin 26 mutation, they have a one-in-four chance of
having a deaf child naturally. See id. Through IVF and pre-implantation genetic
diagnosis, however, a deaf couple can transfer into the woman's uterus only deaf
embryos, to ensure the couple will have a deaf child. See id.
179. See id. at 52-63 (discussing whether being deaf is "a harm"). Some deaf
people argue that deafness is a linguistic and cultural identity rather than a disabil-
ity. See id. at 52.
180. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1873) (overturned 1944).
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would be upset if women were able to assert control over their own repro-
ductive choices was reflected in the fact that until 1944 federal law banned
the use of mail to transmit information about contraception. 8,
The politicization over the debate about whether the Food and Drug
Administration should permit the use of mifepristone (RU-486) demon-
strates how politics and the science of reproduction become embroiled in
political controversies even today.)8 2 The history of state involvement in
regulating human reproduction also provides a number of other illustra-
tions of how reproductive choices can be made captive to a political view-
point. Statutes that were based on prevailing morality and regulated
private choices to limit reproduction are some such illustrations. Until the
Supreme Court affirmed the right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy
during the early stages without state interference, s1 8 3 states enacted a wide
range of laws imposing criminal penalties to prohibit or strictly regulate
the termination of pregnancy.18 4 Some states criminalized the use or sale
of contraceptives until the Supreme Court ruled that married couples,18 5
unmarried persons' 8 6 and minors 8 7 had a right to gain access to these
common means of protection against unwanted pregnancy.
While the fear that attempts to legislate embryo donation could be-
come entangled in political debates over morality and religion may prove
unfounded, it is just as possible that the fear will be realized. Experience
demonstrates that controversies over matters related to human reproduc-
tion in a democratic society tend to become highly political. Debates over
such current issues as regulation of stem-cell research, prohibitions on re-
181. See Consumers Union v. Walker, 145 F.2d 33, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 1944)
(overturning federal ban and ruling that consumer magazine could mail material
dealing with contraceptives to married couples).
182. See Leonard A. Cole, The End of the Abortion Debate, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 217,
217-24 (1989) (discussing debate over RU 486); see also LAWRENCE LADER, A PI-
VATE MA1rER: RU 486 AND THE ABORTION CRISES chs. 10-11 (1995) (describing RU
486 and problems with its introduction in United States); DavidJ. Garrow, Abortion
Before and After Roe v. Wade: An Historical Perspective, 62 ALB. L. REv. 833, 852
(1999) (noting that RU 486 may lead to less viable abortions).
183. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S 113, 163-64 (1973) (ruling that right of privacy
protects woman's right to choose abortion free from state prohibition during early
stages of pregnancy as matter of due process).
184. For a discussion of state statutes regulating abortion prior to the decision
in Roe v. Wade, see Roy Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement and
Administration of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C. L. REV. 730, 733-35 (1968).
185. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (recognizing that
right of privacy ensures that married couple can have access to contraception and
contraceptive counseling free from state interference).
186. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (holding state cannot
convict man of distributing contraceptive to unmarried college student).
187. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977) (declaring
unconstitutional state statute that prohibited sale or distribution of contraceptives
to minors).
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productive cloning'8 8 and whether the use of RU-486 should be legalized
suggest the nature of the problem. The famous maxim of Oliver Wendell
Holmes that a "page of history is worth a volume of logic"' 8 9 is worth con-
sidering in the light of this history.
The absence of controlling legislation will leave resolution of com-
plex issues involving embryos to the courts to be decided on a case-by-case
basis. It has been suggested that the inability of the legislatures or the
courts to develop a coherent body of law governing embryo donation will
at some point in the future require the Supreme Court to decide the is-
sue. 190 Whether this is true or not, for the present, the matter of dispos-
ing of embryos is likely to come up in a number of different legal contexts
and the courts will be hard-pressed to find common ground. This being
so, judges will be inclined to look to various legal analogies, such as those
discussed in this Article, including the law governing adoption, gestational
surrogate parenting, sperm and egg donation, property and personhood.
No one analogy fits embryo transfer perfectly, but some analogies are bet-
ter than others. As expressed earlier in this Article, the intent-based
formula towards legal parenthood developed in the gestational surrogacy
cases seems most useful at this point in time.
III. CONCLUSION
Lawyers and judges are trained to think by analogy when they con-
front a new reality. This Article shows that the use of the adoption analogy
to categorize the transfer of a cryopreserved embryo to a recipient is far
from perfect. The authors believe that embryo "donation" is a more accu-
rate term than embryo "adoption" because it is consistent with both reality
and existing case law. Although some religious organizations advocate the
term embryo adoption in order to elevate the legal status of the embryo,
these organizations can advance their cause for saving embryonic life with-
out pushing toward the legal consideration of embryos as persons.
The word "donation" defeats any implication that the law governing
adoption controls the procedure. Donation implies something generous,
that is, giving to another the potential of life, the ability to bear a child.
This essentially is what is involved when one couple provides its embryos to
another couple.
Some will argue that the law of the marketplace should prevail in em-
bryo transfer. But if the practice is to become one of true donation, then
188. For a list of state legislation governing cloning, see State Cloning Legisla-
tion-May 2003, at http://www.kentlaw.edu/islt/StateCloningLegislation.pdf (last
visited May 24, 2003).
189. N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.).
190. See Jill Madden Melchoir, Cryogenically Preserved Embryos in Dispositional
Disputes and the Supreme Court: Breaking Impossible Ties, 68 U. CIN. L. Rv. 921, 945
(2000) (suggesting that lack of regulation and likely inability of courts to reach
consensus on disposition of growing number of cryopreserved embryos makes it
likely that Supreme Court will ultimately address matter).
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at least ideally it should not become unduly entangled in commercial
transactions based on the purchase and sale of embryos. The commercial-
ization of ova and sperm banking provides a poor example for embryo
donation, which is much more complicated because it involves two per-
sons rather than one. Notwithstanding this, statutes that outlaw the pay-
ment of money for eggs, sperm or embryos are likely to prove
unenforceable. The continued availability of large numbers of unused
cryopreserved embryos suggests that the law of supply may control rather
than the law of demand, reducing the attractiveness of widespread com-
mercialization of the procedure.
As embryo donation becomes more common, the courts will be
forced to confront the application of personal injury, property, contract
and probate, and family law doctrines to the procedure. In the absence of
legislation, the courts will have to do this on a common law basis or by
developing equity doctrines. As the problems associated with the proce-
dure become more prevalent in court cases, it is hoped that the legisla-
tures of the various states will respond by enacting statutes that address
embryo donation problems from the viewpoint of areas of the law in which
an existing body of law already exists. Such areas include the law of cus-
tody, support and contract. The relatively new body of law governing ges-
tational surrogacy is also helpful, especially as the law governing those
cases has come to focus more on the intent of the parties in resolving
disputes than on such static matters as who gave birth or who provided the
gametes. The decisions that treat embryos in an interim category between
property and personhood are also helpful.
Whatever one's views are about modern reproductive technology, an
analysis of the law governing cryopreserved embryos ought not to become
entangled with the fury of the debate over abortion because it deserves to
be analyzed on its own merits. But the danger of asking the political
branches of government to resolve embryo transfer issues by legislation is
that they will become entangled in religious and political conflicts that will
make the law either oppressive or unresponsive to the legitimate repro-
ductive needs of people.
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